St Edward's Academic Review 2025

ST EDWARD’S, OXFORD

Conclusion

blockade (Edwards, 2006), and those that did arrive came months into the war. The Finnish ingenuity and resourcefulness seen in their use of guerilla tactics would have carried them through, with or without a few more planes coming halfway through the war. The League of Nations was involved in the Russo Finnish conflict of 1939–40, although its influence was ultimately restricted. Following Russia’s invasion of Finland, the League was under pressure to act against the Soviet government. William Bullitt and other League officials pushed for tough sanctions on Russia. Joseph Avenol, the Secretary-General of the League, opposed these attempts but eventually gave in to outside pressure and lobbying from other members, especially the French government. The French prime minister, Edouard Daladier, saw a chance to deal a blow to the USSR and win backing for a front on the Baltic. At first, the British government led by Neville Chamberlain was unwilling to take decisive action against Russia. The British League strategy was pragmatic and frequently deferred to more general geopolitical concerns. Although Britain felt sympathy for Finland, it was preferable to deal with the problem through private assistance as opposed to direct League engagement. Eventually, a resolution denouncing Russia for breaking the Covenant and rejecting League authority was approved by the League Council. Russia was consequently removed from the League, though this had little lasting impact. The expulsion had little effect on how the Winter War played out and had more symbolic than practical ramifications. Several variables, such as member nations’ geopolitical interests, ideological concerns, and the League’s limits as an international organisation, influenced the League’s decisions. The war between Russia and Finland highlighted the League’s inability to effectively deter aggression and hinted at its eventual disintegration as a global organisation (Beck P. J., 1981).

The effect of Finnish guerilla warfare tactics on the 100-day Winter War cannot be overstated. However, it would be naïve to state that it was the only definitive factor in preventing the Iron Curtain from being drawn around Finland. To answer the question asked at the beginning of this essay, yes, guerilla warfare tactics employed by the Finnish armed forces were the main reason for Finnish success in avoiding full Soviet occupation in the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40. This is because the highly decentralised command structure used by the Finnish military was in stark contrast to the centralised Soviet structure and proved to be far more effective. Even though the Soviets were disorganised and shockingly led, they were still a much larger force, and their advantage was enormous. The sheer force of numbers deployed by the USSR should have been enough, their new technology should have been enough, but it wasn’t. The Finnish being able to weaponise every part of their surroundings, to turn even the most mundane thing they could find into a deadly weapon was what made them so successful. History has also shown us that a superior army can be undermined by effective guerrilla tactics even when it is being properly led. The current conflict with Ukraine, though in a more urban setting and with more foreign support for the invaded, has been raging for over two years at the time of writing, and the supposed world superpower, the Russian Federation, has still been unable to attain victory. It is easy to think that Soviet military failures were the primary reason for Finnish success since it is a fact that once the Soviets became organised, they began to win. However, it is not entirely true, because even if the Soviets had been operating at ‘ History has also shown us that a superior army can be undermined by effective guerrilla tactics even when it is being properly led ’

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