St Edward's Academic Review 2025

ACADEMIC REVIEW 2025

My original motive for choosing the question was to develop my ability as a historian to gather data and make a judgement based on my own historical analysis, assisted by the analysis of other historians, as well as to develop my ability to find reliable sources and gather what was necessary from them. I have achieved my objective as I have gained highly valuable experience through thoroughly researching my topic and using both the information and opinions present in the sources that I chose and have formulated my own conclusions. In terms of selection of sources, I have learnt much about where the most reliable sources can be found, what signs point to a source being reliable, and how to use the conclusions of other historians to assist or support my own thinking. The major limitations of research into the Winter War relate to factors at play during the war that are incredibly difficult to measure as well as the areas that research has been focused on. Firstly, as I have shown in this essay, morale played a key role in determining the outcome of this war and is one of the best explanations for the success of the relatively small Finnish force against the huge Soviet force. However, its exact impact and the extent of variation in morale between the two militaries is nigh impossible to accurately measure. This is because the morale of even one soldier, let alone an entire army, cannot be measured in the same way that the number of tanks, rounds of ammunition, or soldiers killed can be. A number cannot be given to it, making its exact impact impossible to determine. Secondly, the vast majority of research into the Winter War has been to do with the military strengths and clashes (including intelligence, espionage and other unconventional warfare types) and international diplomacy. Study into domestic Finnish politics and the role this played in the war is limited. The Finnish government did not undergo many significant leadership changes during the Winter War and was led by president Kyösti Kallio throughout. Despite this, one must assume that there would have been cabinet discussion and debate over the war, especially as the armistice approached, with Kallio known to have detested the idea of surrendering any territory to the USSR and to have been very reluctant to sign the armistice. Therefore research into Finnish domestic political affairs before, during and in the aftermath of the Winter War could be valuable to pursue.

full capacity from 30th November 1939, they would still have encountered winding, unpaved roads. They would still have been unprepared for silent killers, ski troopers flying through their camps in the dead of night and caught on the back foot in every successful motti. The element of surprise is not effective only due to the fault of he who allows himself to be surprised. The effect of the reorganisation of the Red Army by Timoshenko is often overstated because the new offensive was only so effective because the failed offensive before it had been so disastrous. Zhdanov’s campaign had made so many mistakes and Timoshenko had addressed and learnt from them all. If he had been in charge from the start, his first offensive would not have been the same as the later one he did oversee – perhaps he too would have underestimated the Finnish dogged grit and determination. Perhaps he too would have been caught off guard. In fact, without seeing the effects of his purge on the Red Army during Zhdanov’s offensive, Stalin probably would not have let Timoshenko bring back the dismissed officers, sack the commissars, or bring back the common ranking system. Yes, Zhdanov’s failures did contribute to the extraordinary initial Finnish victories, but they did not cause them – it was the Finnish ability to capitalise on his mistakes through use of auftragstaktik . Foreign intervention was a too-little-too-late endeavour and thus was the least significant reason for Finnish success in the Winter War. British and French donations were appreciated and useful, but ultimately insignificant compared with pure Finnish sisu and did not alter the course of the war. As argued by Peter J Beck, the League of Nations’ actions in this war were the climax of its ineffectiveness and it proved unable to function as a deterrent to aggression. Finland fought this war alone. Finland fought this war with courage. Finland avoided occupation, domination and repression. The aims that I set out to accomplish in writing this essay were to assess the reasons for Finnish success in the Winter War of 1939-40. The reasons that I was to analyse, and rank based on positive impact on Finnish performance in this war were Finnish guerilla warfare tactics, Soviet military failures and limitations, and diplomacy and foreign involvement. I have assessed these factors and found that Finnish guerilla warfare was the primary reason, followed by Soviet military failures and then foreign involvement. Evaluation

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