St Edward's Academic Review 2025

ACADEMIC REVIEW 2025

failures in the Winter War until Timoshenko took over. Zhdanov was removed from all military offices but was given power over the political aspects of the new campaign. He proved far more effective in this role and sent thousands of enthusiastic political workers to the Northwestern Front to do his bidding. Their message was changed – Soviet soldiers, who had been hearing nothing but Communist Party propaganda throughout the war were now exposed to Soviet patriotism. Essentially, the USSR had been humiliated by the conflict thus far and it was up to the men on the front lines to restore their nation’s honour. Battle cries changed, from “for Stalin” to “for the glory of the fatherland”. As Trotter states, ‘The apathy and dim-wittedness so often observed during the December battles was largely replaced by energy and determination.’ Over 2,600 medals were awarded to those who fought in the December campaign, and a theatrical display was made of it (Trotter, 2013). Soldiers were made more effective, more energetic, more willing to fight and this allowed them to, perhaps not match, but at the very least approach the degree of high morale and determination displayed by their Finnish adversaries. Foreign interference from the West in this war was almost unanimously to support the Finnish, much like in today’s Russo-Ukrainian conflict. However, most of the practical support – people and funding – was done through private groups and not by national governments, likely due to fear of attracting retaliation from the powerful Soviet Union. The most prominent exception to this was action taken by the British and French governments. The British sold the Finns 30 Bristol Blenheim bombers as well as small arms and ammunition, including Boys anti-tank rifles. The French supplied obsolete small arms and ammunition and had aircraft ready to ship before the armistice was signed. A full-scale intervention was planned by the two nations, which involved invasions of Norway and Sweden, and a force of 100,000 troops and 62 bombers was assembled. However, on 5th March, Sweden refused passage, and on the 6th Finnish president Kyösti Kallio authorised the Finnish peace delegation (Butler, Gibbs, Gywer, Ehrman, & Howard, 1976). Although any contributions to Finland’s limited and outdated supplies and machinery were greatly appreciated, it is highly likely that had these donations not been made, the events of the war would not have been different to a significant degree. This is because many of these donations were either delayed or blocked entirely by a German Diplomacy and foreign involvement

Though the reorganisation of the Red Army would spell eventual partial defeat for the Finnish forces, their successes before this contributed significantly to the outcome of the war – Timoshenko had fewer people and machinery to work with by the time he was given control of the military. Finnish success on the Karelian Isthmus in December was not only dependant on sisu, but on Soviet tactical failures – Finnish commander-in-chief Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim referred to the Soviets as ‘a badly conducted orchestra’ (Trotter, 2013). Coordination was severely lacking. Soviet artillery, though powerful and in good supply, was not used accurately. Excessive shots were fired, but only in the general vicinity of Finnish forces. This supports the earlier claim that the Soviets’ far superior technology led to hubris. Soviet field commanders could not rely on successful direct supporting fire. Barrages did not coordinate successfully with infantry, resulting in more than one Soviet formation being hit with friendly fire (Trotter, 2013). The shortfall in skilled leadership following the army purge was so severe it rendered the Soviet armoured force practically useless. Trotter states that ‘Tanks would charge full tilt at the Finnish, break through, then simply mill about like herds of oxen, waiting for someone to tell them what to do next.’ This shows how detrimental the neglect of auftragstaktik was to the Red Army and why mission command is so important. Soviet superiority in technology and supplies meant nothing if they were being used without appropriate direction. Finland’s fastidious approach to the war led to domination on nearly all fronts until Timoshenko and Zhdanov’s reorganisation and campaign allowed for the superior machinery to reach some of its potential. ‘ Finnish commander- in-chief Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim referred to the Soviets as ‘a badly conducted orchestra ’

Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov was the man responsible for many of the Soviet Union’s military

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