St Edward's Academic Review 2025

ACADEMIC REVIEW 2025

perspective are ubiquitous, and even sources that aim to analyse the consequences of the actions of foreign powers such as Britain or France can be found. However, research from Russian universities, historians or any other academics, is nearly completely absent. Once I began research for this dissertation in earnest, I started with the book A Frozen Hell by W M Trotter. This book provided a useful briefing on the state of Russia, Finland, and their relations in the lead-up to the war – an essential topic to have knowledge of in understanding the motivations and forces in play in this war. It is important to keep in mind that this is a book written for a wide audience not an academic publication. This source was referenced in multiple reports, journal articles and web pages that I used later on. Most of these reports, for example the one by Henrik C W Raftsjø, were written for a degree in fields such as Master of Military Studies (MMS) or Master of Arts. Trotter’s book helped me understand the war on a larger scale, and was a source for names of specific military tactics or practices for which I then researched in more depth. For example, whilst reading Chapter 11, I took an interest in the motti tactics mentioned by Trotter, as I saw them as an ideal example of Finnish guerilla tactics. So, I found Raftsjø’s essay, which shed further light on the definition and uses of motti tactics. I used Trotter’s book as a guide to the basic details of all aspects of the war and then found different sources to provide further insight or more varied information. Henrik C W Raftsjø wrote an essay as part of his degree work for a Master of Arts in International Conflict and Security at the Brussels School of International Studies. Titled ‘Tactics vs. Intelligence: Explaining Finnish Effectiveness in The Winter War’, it has a simple structure: explaining why tactics were important, then explaining Finnish, then Soviet tactics; explaining why intelligence was important, then explaining Finnish, then Soviet uses of intelligence. Raftsjø concludes that it was Finland’s indirect military tactics that proved to be the main reason for their success, placing emphasis on motti tactics and its decentralised command structure. Raftsjø’s research paper provided specific information on the details and applications of Finnish and Soviet military tactics, with some useful comparisons. This differed from Trotter’s book because the research paper did not seek to provide a thrilling narrative of the war to people of any level of knowledge, but rather judgement on one aspect of this war, to be submitted to academics specialising in military/

This essay aims to answer why, or more specifically how, the Finnish achieved such a feat. The sections covered will be guerilla warfare tactics used by the Finnish forces; Soviet military failures; and the effectiveness of diplomacy and foreign involvement. In this essay I want to bring together various sources to reveal this war’s significance, to Finland, to the USSR, and to Western civilisation as a whole – the extreme grit and bravery of the Finnish forces deserves not to be forgotten any more than that of any force in the wider Second World War. It is important to note that although Finland held the Soviets at bay, the outcome of the Winter War cannot be called a Finnish victory; however, neither can it be remembered as a victory for the Soviet Union. The war from the USSR’s point of view in a military sense is summed up nicely by an anonymous Red Army general: ‘We won just about enough ground to bury our dead’ (Quist, 2020). When speaking in terms of the relative sizes of the two nations’ militaries, this war can be described as nothing less than pure humiliation for the Soviets; some of the initial battles had a Finnish-to-Soviet death ratio of 1:122. To put that into context, at the start of the war Stalin ordered one million Soviet soldiers to attack the Finnish border, at which point Finland had a standing army of only 33,000. When the Red Army finally reached the Finnish border on 30th November 1939, it had only 450,000 soldiers; Finland had managed to mobilise a force of 250,000. The Soviets sent 2,300 aircraft to face Finland’s 114. The invaders had 6,000 tanks while Finland had only 32 (Shvangiradze, 2023). Therefore, whilst the war is classified as a defeat for the Finnish, their success (especially in the earlier parts of the conflict) in the Winter War is astonishing when considering the truly massive foe that they faced. There is a word sisu in Finnish. It has no viable direct translation but can be derived from sisus , the literal translation is the intestines – guts. It means grit; the bravery to persevere with pride and dignity in the face of all adversity (Smirnova, 2018). There could be hardly a word more fitting to explain the remarkable feats of the Finnish armed forces.

Literature Review

The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 has been immortalised in writing and in image almost exclusively by Western historians. This includes Finnish historians. Sources from a Soviet perspective are rare but available, sources from the Finnish

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