St Edward's Academic Review 2025

5

The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 was intended by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Politburo to be a swift war of limited impact on their armed forces yet significant impact on the Soviet geopolitical stance, with the acquisition of the Karelian Isthmus and therefore access to the Gulf of Finland. What played out was one of the most bitter and bloody wars fought by the Soviet Union. Nobody expected the extreme resistance and resilience the Finnish military brought to the front lines, despite their limited, outdated, and insufficient technology and resources, least of all one of the greatest military powers of the 20th century. Yet somehow, this war has passed under the radar of modern history, almost as if it had been as swift and predictable as the USSR presumed it would be. But it was far from it. For 100 days, the Finnish Republic fought valiantly against the Soviet Union, fighting to prevent being subjugated and conquered by a neighbouring power once again, as they had been by the Swedish Empire and Tsarist Russia beforehand. To what extent was Finnish guerilla warfare the main reason for Finnish success in avoiding full occupation in the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–40? By Daniel Shuter

Introduction