SE Academic Review 2023

73 ACADEMIC REVIEW 2023

“ ...Tudor was alerted to his imminent

Tudor - his single intention in the plan - but by supporting the Bretons militarily, he had furthered French hostility (Baldwin, 2015, p. 196). Even with Tudor ensconced in the French court, though, there was no great immediate danger to Richard’s position. Anne had no obvious reason to pursue a hasty invasion of England - her country’s motives were, as ever, largely defensive. It is at this point, therefore, that the legacy of the Hundred Years War became most important in deciding Richard’s fate, and indeed the future of the English crown. The French government was still acting firmly within the mindset of binary antagonism with England: a foe that could be dealt with only by diplomacy or conflict. The diplomacy of Picquigny was increasingly irrelevant, and the chances of conflict even greater. Put simply, the French decided that they should be the ones to initiate that conflict; and in Henry Tudor, they had the best chance to destroy the vestiges of English claims to French soil by beating them on the fields of England. ‘They lived under the belief ’, wrote Charles Ross, ‘that England was an actively hostile power, eager to attack France with any allies she could raise’ (Ross, 1988, p. 200). That belief had been ingrained in Anglo-French culture by the Hundred Years War; too often, French rulers had deemed attack as the best form of defence. By 1484, that same spirit was still as alive as ever. The fighting of the next year would only show how important that conflict was to the identities of England and France, and how its end would change their relationship more profoundly than anything in the century that came before.

capture just in time for him to escape, with his entourage... ”

Henry Tudor may have become a figurehead for dissident English upon Richard’s usurpation, but it was no sure thing that his claims to the throne would be backed by France in nominal, let alone military, terms any time soon. Throughout his 14 year exile on the continent, Tudor had been merely a ‘plaything of circumstance’ - used as a bargaining chip by Breton, French and English powers. Until 1484, he was ‘not regarded as a potential claimant to the throne of England, but rather as a possible focus for English dissidents who could be exploited’ (Griffiths, 1986, p. 205). In an important way, Richard’s eagerness to get hold of Tudor only strengthened the importance of Henry’s position: the more Richard promised to secure his elimination, the greater his worth to the cause of the struggling French government. In June 1484, Richard agreed a deal with Duke Francis at Pontefract (Horspool, 2017, p. 229). The English agreed to give 1,000 archers to defend Brittany against any French invasion, and Landais gave the assurance that Tudor would be placed under ‘strict surveillance’ (Ross, 1988, p. 199). But the plan got out: such was the intricacy of spying networks at the time that Tudor was alerted to his imminent capture just in time for him to escape with his entourage to the French border, where Anne of Beaujeu was only too happy to welcome him. Not only had Richard failed to get hold of