SE Academic Review 2023

72 ST EDWARD’S, OXFORD

imminent throughout 1484-5 (Ross, 1988, p. 200). Richard’s actions, therefore, enhanced his dangerous reputation in the French court. What he had underestimated was the readiness of that court to take action to prevent English aggression. If Richard did little to assuage the contemporary stereotype of the aggressive English king among foreign rulers, he was also at the mercy of events on the continent which were based just as much on the traditional picture of the Hundred Years War. In 1483, Louis XI had been succeeded by the young Charles VIII, whose sister, Anne of Beaujeu, ruled as regent. Anne saw the peace agreed at Picquigny as fragile, and was aware of the stark possibility of a new Anglo-Breton or Anglo-Burgundian alliance to invade a France under no clear leadership. The court of Charles’ government quickly became beset by internal divisions as well: a contest for power between the Houses of Bourbon and Orleans. Louis of Orleans (later Louis XII) sought to undermine the authority of the regency, and looked to the divided state of Brittany for support. Yet Brittany was also riven by divisions: Duke Francis was largely impotent, and the state ruled by the unpopular treasurer Pierre Landais. Malcontent Breton nobles looked to Anne of Beaujeu in the hope of unseating Landais. Meanwhile, Orleans dreamt up a coalition of Landais, Richard and Maximilian of Austria in order to form a wide front against the Bourbon power in France; Richard was included in this hypothetical pact (Penn, 2020, p. 529). It was a traditional form of 15th-century alliance, based on mutual antagonism and the desire to undermine competitors for power. For Richard, it seemed immediately appealing: Landais was happy to hand over Henry Tudor, in return for a contingent of British archers who would protect Brittany against French attack (Grant, 1993, p. 125). In effect, Richard had chosen to side with the minor continental power - Brittany - for the purpose of getting his hands on Henry Tudor. What he did not foresee, or contemplate, was the equal and opposite hostility of the Bourbon crown to this movement (Griffiths, 1986, p. 205).

In France, Richard’s usurpation was viewed as a clear act of violence and ambition, and the disappearance of the princes in the Tower of London as a confirmation of his personal ruthlessness. The knowledge that his claim to the throne was dubious brought the figure of Henry Tudor firmly back into the picture, with Tudor having been cut out by the ruthlessness of Edward’s execution of Clarence and closer link to the crown. It became clear in 1484 that Henry Tudor was the most likely candidate to unseat Richard from his incongruous position on the throne; the movement of English dissidents to his Breton location confirms this. For Richard after the Buckingham rebellion, therefore, Tudor was the greatest threat to his position, if not an immediate one. For the Bretons under an ailing Duke Francis, he was a bargaining chip whom they could employ with the English to ensure support against the more aggressive French. For the French themselves, under the management of Anne of Beaujeu as regent for the new Charles VIII, he was a potential figurehead for an invasion with the purpose of unseating the English king. If the intended results - foreign conquest, positioning of a friendly ruler on a hostile throne - were familiar, so were the real motives as well. Both France and England were in fact acting defensively. Richard knew that he had to deal effectively with the Bretons to secure Tudor, and not aggravate the French into using him as a stalking horse for an invasion. Yet the French motives were equally defensive: Richard’s reckless reputation (formed by his anger at the 1475 peace settlement) heightened fears that he could be ready to bring a large force back to Calais to make inroads into former territory (Grant, 1993, p. 116). To foreign observers, the England of the 15th century was either at war with the north, the south, or itself. The weakness of the French crown under the 13-year-old Charles, and the threats from Burgundy and Brittany, ensured that Anne of Beaujeu was wary of any chance of an English invasion. This fear would be maintained throughout Richard’s reign, and the discussion of invasion at the Estates General in January 1484 showed the effect of ‘vigorous’ rumours that English action was