St Edward's Academic Review 2025

ACADEMIC REVIEW 2025

over, despite the results. On the other end of the spectrum, the whole ideology of the Finnish field commanders was based around freedom of both movement and thought for the Finnish troops – all were given some degree of autonomy, making each and every Finnish soldier both more effective and less predictable. It was the agility of the Finnish and the level of access they had to the terrain that allowed them to take the initiative and use innovative tactics to compensate for their vastly inferior technology and numbers. The contrast in leadership styles is key in understanding the causes of Finnish success in this war. The Finnish command structure is an ideal example of auftragstaktik (also called mission command) – individual soldiers are given more leeway by their superiors to make decisions on their course of action whilst on the field (Herrera, 2022). The Red Army employed for the most part normaltaktik, wherein action beyond or additional to orders is discouraged and often prohibited. The reason behind this difference in leadership is likely due to the difference in forms of government in the Soviet Union and Finland, and to Stalin’s paranoia. ‘ The Finnish command structure is an ideal example of auftragstaktik (also called mission command) – individual soldiers are given more leeway by their superiors to make decisions on their course of action whilst on the field ’

and figures are not, and as such it was a sufficient source providing narrative and judgement, both essential in studying this war. Though a clichéd one, the idea that “history is written by the victors” does bear some truth. Finding completely objective sources for any topic is impossible, even more so when the topic is a direct clash between two sides, which is exactly what this war was. Even so, I have done my best to take the subjective judgements from the sources I have used – to consider them, take the facts, and then make my own judgement. This war was not one of advanced espionage and was not covered up by significant propaganda – journalists were in Helsinki for nearly the whole duration. There was an international reaction the moment the first bombs fell on the Finnish capital; eyes were on this war the whole time, long before it was won. Thus, it is safe on some level to assume that facts and statistics from reputable, academic sources are true due to the visibility of this war. The pre-existing condition essential for the Finnish forces’ successful guerilla tactics was Finland’s highly rural and undeveloped geography. In 1939, Finland’s eastern territory bordering Russia had very few roads, none were paved, few were interconnected, and all were narrow (McKay & McKlay, 2017). Most of these roads, due to the season in which this war took place, were flanked by either large snowdrifts or thick forests. This made lateral movement nigh impossible, a monumental issue for the Soviets who had foolishly prepared for a full-scale frontal assault. The Red Army travelled in large, armoured convoys that were unable to penetrate the forests and had to move slowly down the narrow tracks. These formations could only move forwards or backwards, making them extremely susceptible to ambushes, a weakness which the Finnish exploited to their advantage. There was one way that this hostile terrain could be traversed – skis. Finnish ski-troopers had been skiing this landscape since childhood and could glide through forests, make a quick attack on a Soviet convoy and ski away into the thick wooded hills, where they could not be pursued and were easily lost amongst the snow and trees by Soviet marksmen. The Soviets were road-bound and lacklustre; inflexible leadership meant that the same frontal assault tactics were used over and Finnish guerilla warfare

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